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U.S. American Commission to Negotiate...

The military effort of the Serbians, Croatians...

[Paris]

[1919?]

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

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THE MILITARY EFFORT

OF THE

SERBIANS, CROATIANS and SLOVENES

in the war 1914-18.

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SERBIANS, CROATIANS and SLOVENES

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The course of the political events that immediately preceded the war is well known. We will only underline the fact that Serbia has been attacked, when she never had the intention of making war. She was feeling, indeed, an absolute need of peace ; her people, after the Balkanic wars, of 1912-13 was aspiring to rest and wanting only to return to normal life. The attack began therefore at a time when Serbia was not prepared for war, when she had to think of reorganizing her army in order to be ready for all circumstances.

Conscious of her part and of her task, Serbia understood that she was engaging a decisive struggle in which not only her own destiny was going to be played but also the destiny of all the Serbians, Croatians and Slovenes bent under the yoke of the Habsburgs, and she rose for the defence of her liberty and her independence, as well as for the independence of the whole Serbo-Croato-Slovene nation.

Weakened and small in numbers the Serbian army had neither arms, ammunition, nor equipments : that is why the Austrian statesmen and army commanders thought they would vanquish her rapidly. For this reason they gave to the first attack the name of " punishing expedition " (Strafexpedition). In giving this name to their operations against Serbia they perhaps wanted to justify beforehand the numerous atrocities which they committed.

Serbia mobilized all men able to carry weapons ;

she equipped them, gave them a rifle of different models, using even very old ones ; she also employed the old de Bange guns which were out of use long ago. In this way, from the very beginning she opposed to the enemy a badly equipped and insufficiently armed army, but with a splendid morale.

The summary statment which is going to follow will show the development of the following operations which it is indispensable to make known to the whole world.

A. — *Period of 1914-1915.*

The operations of the Austro-Hungarian army began with the bombardment of all Serbian towns, along the Save and the Danube. The civil population suffered the most from these bombardments. A little later, the 13-th August 1914, the Austro-Hungarian army undertook a powerful offensive with a view of outflanking the front by crossing the Drina and the Sava. The first successes which the enemy troops put to their credit against our feeble rear-guard elements intoxicated them and, when they invaded our territory, they committed numerous acts of barbarism : burnings of villages and towns, murders and hangings of children, women and old people.

The Serbian army which had been regrouped on the central position formed by the line Valiyevo-Arandielovatz-Palanka, marched against the enemy masses ; they joined them very soon, and after a bloody battle of six days on the Yadar and the Tser, won a complete victory.

The enemy was quite defeated and thrown back on the other side of the frontier, leaving in our hands nearly 10.000 prisoners, some 60 cannon and a considerable quantity of other war material.

At the same time the war was equally raging on the other allied fronts. Although greatly weakened by the losses we had suffered, especially in consequence of our deficiency in heavy artillery and ammunition, our army did not content itself with this success. In order

to answer to the desires of our allies and to immobilize an important part of the Austro-Hungarian army and to alleviate the already critical military position of the Russians, we rapidly concentrated our forces ; then, in the first days of September, we undertook simultaneously two offensives : one on the other side of the Sava, in Syrmia, the other in Bosnia, in the direction of Sarayevo.

These offensives were pursued with success; in a few days, nearly the whole of Syrmia fell into our hands ; in Bosnia, our troops, seconded by Montenegrin troops, attained to the gates of Sarayevo. But an hostile counter-offensive led with important forces was produced on the inferior course of the Drina : the Montenegrin army was obliged to retire on the other side of the Drina and our advance was stopped.

In consequence of this situation, the first army abandoned Syrmia in order to come to the help of the other parts of the Serbian army which was laboriously resisting on the Drina while our troops with the Montenegrin troops were obliged to retire from Sarayevo.

For fifty days fierce fights were pursued without interruption. During this period, our troops held the enemy nailed within the angle formed by the Sava and the Drina and on the mountain chain which spreads on the right side of the Drina.

But, in consequence of the superiority of the enemy forces, especially in heavy artillery, in consequence also of our want of ammunition we were obliged to retreat in the first days of November and to abandon Belgrade.

Defending step by step the national territory, we slowly retired during a whole month and reformed our troops on the central positions lying North of Gorni-Milanovatz-Kragouyevatz and Mladenovatz.

As soon as the first arrival of ammunition had come from France (about 30.000 shells) we again attacked the enemy — who had already spread the news of his complete and definitive victory-and, in scarcely nine days, we completely beat him and threw him out of our frontier.

Our victory was decisive : about 60.000 prisoners, 300 cannon, and a considerable quantity of material remained in our hands; but this victory was bought at the price of very heavy sacrifices. Our unities very much reduced, were only the skeleton of their primitive formations. The want of ammunition and clothings, the bad equipment of the men, the revictualling, rendered difficult by the insufficiency of the lines of communication, which were in a very bad state or had even been destroyed by the enemy, all these causes, in addition to the bad season, did not allow the Serbian army to profit to the end of our victory and to undertake a strategical pursuit of great extent. Besides, at the same time a terrible epidemy of exanthematical typhus broke out which had been introduced by the enemy troops. We suffered enormous losses, in the ranks of the army as well as among the civil population, and the epidemy was definitely checked only in the month of May 1915, thanks to the generous assistance sent by our allies, but especially thanks to the help given to us by numerous American, British, and French physicians who had hastened to Serbia.

In calling two new classes we managed to fill up, to a certain extent the vacancies in the ranks of our army and made active preparations for new offensive undertakings on the other side of the Sava and the Drina.

When, in August 1915 these preparations were terminated and when all dispositions for the offensive had already been taken, that is when the Serbian army was on the point to attack the enemy for the third time, the retreat of the Russian army modified the situation.

The attitude of Bulgaria was becoming openly hostile and very soon commenced the preparations of a new offensive, concerted this time between Austria-Hungary, Germany and Bulgaria.

In the beginning of October 1915, Serbia was attacked on three different sides, on a front exceeding a thousand kilometres by enemy forces nearly three times superior to her own.

Yet the Serbian army was resisting and tenaciously defending her positions against all attacks. But treacherously attacked in the rear by the whole Bulgarian army (about 400.000 combatants), abandoned by her ally Greece, Serbia was driven in a very critical situation, aggravated by the delay of her great allies to come to her help ; she had to choose between a capitulation and the retreat through Albania i. e. through impracticable mountains without any roads where her army could not find anything for her subsistance. And yet she decided on this last solution, and her troops took the road of Albania where they found, after having gone through immense and indescribable sufferings and after having had terrible losses, the welcome and the assistance of our allies, especially of the British and French. At the beginning of 1916 our army was transported to Corfu; only a very small part of the fighting troops and the majority of the wounded and sick were transported to Bizerte and in other great towns of French North Africa.

From the very first days of this period and during the whole course of these events, Montenegro courageously stood on the side of Serbia. After having mobilized all the population able of wearing arms, that country had formed an army of fifty thousand men who had bravely fought at the side of our own, repulsed the attack of considerable enemy forces and taken part in our offensive against Sarayevo. The retreat of the Serbian army made their position just as critical : capitulation or retreat through Albania; no other choice. Unfortunately, in consequence of the faint-heartedness of the Government and the Government circles the Montenegrin army capitulated and the enemy could occupy the whole of Montenegro.

B. — *Period 1916-1917-1918*

a) Period 1916-1917. — In Corfou, although their disembarkment was made under very difficult conditions, in the absence of every cantonment and every preparation

for their reception, the Serbian troops succeeded to organize themselves in a period of two months. The heavy losses which our troops had suffered during the preceding campaign had reduced their effectives to one hundred and fifty thousand men. But although reduced to six divisions of infantry and one division of cavalry our troops, well embodied and animated with a remarkable morale, still represented an important factor of the allied army on the Salonica front; their last elements were transported there from Corfu at the end of the month of May 1916.

Immediately after they had received their arms and equipments in the Chalcidica, our troops occupied a notable part of the Macedonian front, nearly the whole of the front on the right side of the Vardar. In consequence of this occupation the situation of the allied army was notably bettered towards the enemy as well as towards Greece whose conduct, under the reign of King Constantine had always been threatening for the security of the allies.

The arrival of the Serbian army on the front was marked by many small engagements with the Bulgarians; our troops successfully attacked their adversaries on every place where it was necessary to conquer favourable positions in view of the future development of the operations.

With the aim of preventing Roumania to join the war on the side of the allies, to separate, near Salonica, the allied army from Greece and to give the latter a favourable occasion to attack the allies, the Bulgarians commenced in the month of August an offensive in the environs of Monastir. After partial and very expensive successes won from one of our divisions which had been thrown on a considerable front, the Bulgarians were stopped and repulsed thanks to the rapid arrival of our reinforcements and to the resistance of our troops which occupied the positions West of the lake Ostrova.

A short time later our troops undertook an energitical offensive which lasted three whole months, nearly to the end of 1916; during this offensive and with the help of the allied

troops we liberated Monastir and a part of our country, but it was not possible to further pursue the victory.

The allied army, having no reserves, was extremely tired and weakened; on the other hand, the Bulgarians were considerably reinforced, by several German regiments and a powerful artillery, especially heavy artillery.

These severe losses were principally felt by the Serbian army of which thirty thousand men had been killed or wounded; our only resource to fill up our losses consisted in the reinforcments which Yougoslav volunteers brought us from all parts of the world, but, for different reasons, their arrival was very slow and difficult. For this reason, the Serbian G. H. Q. was obliged to suppress an infantry regiment in every division.

Two attemps of a partial offensive on the Serbian front, in 1917, did not succeed; the allied army did not dispose, on the Salonica front, of any numerical superiority, neither in the effectives, nor in the heavy artillery, a superiority necessary to realize on a given point of the lines the grouping of indispensable forces to break through a well organized front, defended by a powerful army.

The Serbian G. H. Q. at the Paris conference in March 1916 as well as in many other circumstances, underlined the importance of the Balkan front and of the great results one could gain there with a victory on that front : to arrive to this result a reinforcment of four to six divisions and about sixty pieces of heavy artillery would have been sufficient. The result would have been the rupture of the line Berlin-Constantinople, the elimination of Bulgaria from the Quadruple-Alliance and the isolation of Turkey. The Serbian G. H. Q., in its memorandums and by the medium of its delegate to the allied conferences of March 1916, November 1916 and by the medium of its special delegate of November 1917 always demanded the reinforcement of the Salonica front proving that the European war would be resolved on that front. All these memoranda terminated thus; " Political and military reasons demand it because :

1) By a victory gained on the Bulgarians, the communication Berlin-Constantinople would be cut, Serbia reconstituted, which would be advantageous for our allies and very prejudiciable, from all points of view, for the Central Powers;

2) By a victory gained on the Bulgarians, Turkey would be obliged to sign peace;

3) All the events of the war have proved till now that Austria-Hungary represents the feeble part of the central powers; Bulgaria and Turkey, once out of action, one ought to attack Austria-Hungary with all allied forces. Her southern frontier not being fortified, she would quickly be obliged to sue for peace.

For all these reasons, the Salonica front is very important and it is indispensable to accord it a very serious attention".

Yet, all these memoranda remained without result; the Serbian G. H. Q. profited of this forced expectation to prepare our common victory: in 1916 a division composed of Serbian, Croatian and Slovene volunteers gloriously fought in the Dobroudja with the Roumanian and Russian armies; during the winter of 1916 and in the spring of 1917 a new division of Yougoslav volunteers was formed; these two divisions constituted an army-corps under the command of a Serbian general.

The Russian revolution and the events which followed it on the Russo-Roumanian front prevented those troops to continue their fight on this front. The Royal Government and the Serbian G. H. Q. requested the allies to transport this army to the front of Salonica. Different difficulties, political and technical, did not permit this transport before the spring of 1918, partly by Arkhangel, partly by Vladivostok; but these troops were then reduced nearly by half i. e. to only one division, in consequence of the propaganda of the Russian Bolcheviks and the difficulties of supplies and transport.

b) Period 1918. — By the arrival of that division of volunteers from Russia, of some thousands of volunteers

from America and France and a small number coming from Italy (whom Italy had accepted in her ranks) the Serbian army was reinforced in satisfactory proportions. The allied troops had equally had their effectives and their heavy artillery reinforced.

However, the great enemy offensive on the Western front, as well as the peace which had been concluded with Russia and Roumania, had put the allied armies of Salonica in a very serious situation. The enemy could, in a relatively short time, bring reinforcements sufficient for undertaking a powerful offensive on the Salonica front, whilst the allied army, not only could not be reinforced, but had even been weakened by the withdrawal of the Russian division, and later of a British cavalry brigade and of a British infantry division immediately after.

The Greek army, with the exception of the corps of the National Defence, was only in the period of organization and armament; one could not, therefore, rely on their aid.

This situation obliged the allied army to face all the contingencies of a great and powerful enemy offensive.

The Serbian army, after two years of uninterrupted combats on a very difficult front, was rightly expecting to see its front restricted. However, we were obliged, as well as the allied troops, to stretch the front in order to allow the creation of the necessary reserves; we were also obliged to elaborate numerous works of defence and fortifications in order to cover Salonica and the Greek territory.

Notwithstanding this difficult situation, we did not remain inactive in face of the enemy during the first half of 1918: we executed several attacks on the enemy positions which were crowned with success.

When, in the second half of the same year a great offensive had been decided on the front of Salonica, the Serbian G. H. Q. consented to its being executed on the front of the Serbian army. The Serbian G. H. Q. and the Serbian army understood very well that one was entering

the supreme phase of the war; they accepted, with a complete confidence in the Victory, the idea of a decisive offensive against the Bulgarians and the Germans, offensive to which we had to devote ourselves completely.

In less than two months, we made the necessary preparations ; constantly observed by the enemy, who, thanks to his dominating position and notwithstanding all our precautions, could see all our preparations. In the middle of September, the whole Serbian army and two French divisions began to attack, assisted by the offensives of the other allied troops on all the front.

The Franco-Serbian troops threw themselves into the fight with such an ardour that, after a struggle of forty-eight hours, they succeeded to pierce the front which the enemy G. H. Q. had considered impregnable ; immediately after, the Serbian army undertook the energetic pursuit of the enemy.

In five days, on a front of 16 miles, we realized an advance of 38 miles, crosed the Vardar and put, in this way, on both sides of the Vardar an important portion of the adverse forces in a situation without issue.

Although the enemy had reinforced his lines with ten regiments, he did not succeed to stop the push of the Serbian troops which continued their pursuit towards Skoplyé (Uskub), Kumanovo and Tzarevo Sélo. In a fortnight, the Bulgaro-German army was beaten on a large front and cut in two : magnificent success which allowed our troops to penetrate in Bulgarian territory and which brought about the capitulation of Bulgaria.

The result of this offensive was to give the allies 90.000 prisoners, more than 800 cannon and enormous quantities of war material. In the beginning, not being able to be revictualled and to evacuate our wounded, because of the want of transport material and in consequence of the destruction of the means of communication, the first Serbian army alone was able to continue its advance ; but, soon after, the second Serbian army joined the first, accompanied by a French cavalry brigade and by French heavy

artillery, and, all together, we pursued our victorious march for the liberation of the country of all the Serbians, Croatians and Slovenes.

The Germano-Austro-Hungarian army composed of three German divisions and two Austro-Hungarian divisions with some fragments of German troops from the eleventh Bulgaro-German army under the command of General Koeves, tried to stop our advance on the ancient frontiers of Serbia.

In a fight which lasted two days near Vranyé, our troops completely routed the ninth Austro-Hungarian division which had been thrown in front in order to protect the concentration and the organization of the enemy troops destined to the defence of Nish. With a single jump, they reached Nish, although they felt a great want in ammunition and after a fierce fight of three days, against an enemy twice as strong, they completely routed him and delivered Nish.

After that our troops easily broke the enemy resistance; in forty-five days of unceasing fights and forced marches our first army, covering 440 miles, without any revictualling and boots, victoriously arrived on the banks of the Sava and the Danube, liberating thus the whole of Serbia and Belgrade her capital. Immediately after, we crossed the Sava, the Drina and the Danube, carrying with us the greeting of liberty to all our nation with three names; at the same time our other troops were directed against Scutari, were beating the last remnants of the Austro-Hungarian army of Albania, were taking Scutari and delivering the whole of Montenegro.

The offensive, which had commenced the 15th of September, permitted our troops to execute a remarkable operation, as Skoplye was already taken on the 26th of September, Vranye the 4th of October; Leskovatz, the 7th; Nish, the 13th, Paratchin the 23rd; Pojarevatz the 28th; and at this date we had already reached the Danube. On the second of November our troops entered Belgrade and on the 14th they terminated the war, and

entered Temeshvar, Arad, Zagreb, Lyoublyana, Rieka, Dubrovnik, Cattaro, achieving thus the delivrance of all Yougoslavia.

As one sees, a campaign of two weeks had sufficed to compel the capitulation of a Bulgaro-German army of half a million men. The " glorious " Bulgarian army, which consented to be compared only to the Japanese army, was completely annihilated after a fight of a few days and obliged to kneel before the Serbian army. In order to obtain this result, our army had to put in the game all their physical and moral resources up to the extreme limit of their possibilities. Although inferior in number, extenuated by fights which had been lasting several years already and by enormous losses, they did not mind any sacrifices in men and blood for the common cause of the allies ; they devoted themselves, body and soul, for the supreme fight to vanquish and deliver their country, or to die.

They did not flinch before any sacrifice, did not dread either losses or hunger, always rushing forwards, bootless, in order to prevent the enemy to escape defeat. What other armies judged impossible, the Serbian army has done; they pursued the enemy in his definitive retreat, making daily an average of 25 miles, and sometimes more than 38 miles.

That is why the Serbian Army and the Yougoslav nation can quietly await the judgment of History and the acknowledgment of their claims on the part of our great Allies.

But this great victory has cost the Serbian people considerable sacrifices.

The effort which Serbia has made in the World's War and the losses she has sustained for the success of the allied cause are shown, with a clear evidence, by the official figures which follow :

Serbia had mobilized :

in July 1914. . . . . 489.500 men;

in September 1914 she had under her flags. . . . . 532.710 men;

and in August 1915. . . . . 572.121 men.

She has mobilized in all, during the war, from the 1-st of July 1914 to October 1915 : 707.343 men, which amounts to 24 % of her total population or 40 % of her male population.

No State has furnished such an effort during this war.

Yet, this is only the effort made by the Serbian nation from Serbia. If one adds all the Yougoslav volunteers from Austria-Hungary who have formed special units fighting on the fronts of Russia, Salonika and Roumania, as well as those who have fought in small units or individually in the American, French and Italian armies, this number is considerably greater.

Serbia formed, with Yougoslav volunteers, an Army-Corps of two divisions which operated in Russia and which amounted to 40.000 men. After the Roumanian catastrophe 15.000 men of that corps were brought to the Salonika front ; they composed there the Yougoslav division which was covered with glory during the offensive of September 1918.

Besides, 10.000 volunteers from America, France, Italy and Russia arrived on the Salonika front ; they were employed to reinforce the actual amount of Serbian units.

If one adds to this figure the number of the men who fought on the other fronts of the allied Armies, one can say that at least 100.000 Yougoslav volunteers have taken part in the battles against the common enemy, — which means that the Serbian nation has levied, during this war, 800.000 soldiers, including the 50.000 men mobilized by Montenegro.

The losses sustained by our Army in this war are enormous.

According to official figures they are the following :

In 1914	69.022	killed, died of wounds or sickness ;
In 1915	56.842	» » » » » »
		(till September).
In 1915	150.000	» » » » » »
		(during the retreat through Albania).
In 1916	7.208	» » » » » »
In 1917	2.270	» » » » » »
In 1918	7.000	» » » » » »
Total :	292.342	

when one adds to this number the 77.278 missed during the retreat of Albania and who are certainly dead, the Serbian Army has lost in this war 369.620 men, *that is half of the mobilized men.*

Concerning the losses of the Montenegrin Army, we do not possess the exact figures, but they are surely not inferior to 20.000 killed or dead in consequence of wounds or sickness.

But these losses are only the losses of the Serbian Army ; one must add the losses sustained — according to the Austrian papers themselves — of the population which had remained behind in Serbia, as well as those which were sustained in the concentration camps of prisoners or interned ; they are not less than 630.000. It results, therefore, *that the Serbian nation, in Serbia alone, has given one million men who died for the victory on the common enemy.*

We regret very much not to be able to give complete statistical figures on the amount of Yougoslavs who fell on the other fronts ; but we believe that the above figures are already sufficiently eloquent to prove the veritable catastrophe which the Serbian nation was submitted to, the Serbian nation which remained true to their Allies — notwithstanding all these terrible losses — up to the end ; and for these reasons our nation hopes that our Allies will unanimously help us to realize our national unity.

ANNEX

THE SERBIAN LOSSES

The Austro-Hungarian Government has published, in 1917, the first results of the census of the population of that part of Serbia which was occupied by Austro-Hungarian troops.

These results are the following :

" The last censuses made by the Serbian authorities in the Kingdom of Serbia accused a notable increase of the population. This increase amounted, from 1890 to 1895, to 6.9 °/o. From 1895 to 1900 and from 1900 to 1905, the increase amounted to 7.8 °/o for each period of five years.

" The census of 1910 gave, as number of inhabitants, the figure of 2.911.701 which represents an increase of 8.3 °/o. Considering this number of increase of the Serbian population, Serbia ought to have had, in 1916, 3.170.000 inhabitants, of whom 1.700.000 in the regions occupied by the Austro-Hungarian troops. The census which was made on the 10-th of July 1916 accused, in these regions, only 1.218,027 inhabitants, without counting the three departments of New Serbia occupied in 1913, which represents a diminution of the population of 28.2 °/o, or, in comparison with the census of 1910, a diminution of 22.3 °/o.

" This important diminution of the population is a consequence of the state of war in which Serbia was since 1912, as well as of epidemies which have also contributed, in a great measure, to the decline of the population.

" The diminution of the male population in the regions occupied by the Austro-Hungarians (the three new departments not included) in comparison with the census

of 1910, amounts to 309.911 persons, i. e. 38.3 o/o; for the female population to 40.110, i. e. 5.3 o/o. A total diminution of 350.021.

" The strongest diminution of the male population has been in the town of Belgrade (65,6 o/o), then Shabatz (47.6 o/o) and Valievo (42.7 o/o). The town which had the smallest diminution of its male population is Kragouyevatz (26.7 o/o).

The strongest diminution of the female population was in the town of Belgrade (21.6 o/o), then of Shabatz (16 o/o). The towns of Kragouyevatz and Krushevatz accuse a small increase of the female population. This is explained by the great number of families which, during the operations, took refuge in these regions.

" In Serbia, as is also the case in all the countries of South-Eastern Europe, the male population is more numerous than the female. According to the census of 1910, there were 100 men for 94 or 95 women; the actual census, however, shows a proportion of 100 men for 144 women, or of 100 women for 69 men. The departments in which the number of the male population is the highest are those of Krushevatz and Tchatchak (100 women for 75 men), while in the town of Belgrade there are 100 women for 58 men only. In the three new departments there are 98 men for 100 women.

« Serbia, a country mostly mountainous, which scarcely possessed any industry whatever, had 60 inhabitants per square kilometre. The density of her population was therefore the same as in Croatia and Slavonia. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the population was less dense than in Serbia. In the regions occupied by the Austro-Hungarian armies, the density of the population was equal, in 1910, to 65 inhabitants per squ. km.; according to the census of 1916 the density had fallen to 51 per squ. km. which represents an average diminution of 14 o/o.

" The town of Belgrade had 7.489 inhabitants per squ. km.; now there are only 3.993, i. e. a diminution of 3.496 inhabitants per squ. km. ".

In publishing these informations, the Austro-Hungarian press added :

" The Austro-Hungarian authorities had proceeded, as has just been said, to the census of the population and have published the results of that census; the Bulgarian authorities, on their side, have done nothing of the kind. Yet, the territories of the Kingdom of Serbia, occupied by Austria-Hungary form only one third of the territory of the Kingdom, while the other two thirds were occupied by the Bulgarians.

" If one considers the facts :

" 1) That the fiercest fights took place in the regions occupied by the Bulgarians;

" 2) That the population has surely fled in great numbers before the enemy, fearing the Bulgarian cruelties;

" 3) That the Bulgarians proceeded to deportations in masses, taking away all the notabilities, the merchants, functionaries, teachers, and priests, as well as all peasants of all ages, under the only condition that they were able to walk;

" It is easy to imagine how great must have been the diminution of the population in these regions.

" The difference of 350.022 inhabitants less shown by the Austro-Hungarian census must be added to the figure representing the diminution of the population of the regions held by the Bulgarians, difference which is twice as great as the first and which must amount to 700.000 inhabitants.

" If one adds to these figures the figures representing the diminution of the population of the regions which are not spoken of in these two statistics (a total of 100.000 persons), one comes to the result that the total diminution of the Serbian population amounts to 1.150.000 persons.

" If one deducts from this total number of 1.150.000 the 200.000 Serbians who are on the front of Salonika, in Corfou, in France and elsewhere, as well as the 150.000 prisoners of war and interned in Austria-Hungary and

Bulgaria, i. e. a total deduction of 350.000, one comes to the result that the figure of 800.000 Serbians represents the minimum of the losses in men killed or dead from epidemies during the last four years (1912-1916), during which Serbia was constantly at war. However, this number in reality only represents the absolute diminution of the total number of the population. If one wants to arrive to the approximative number of the men killed or dead of diseases, one must also consider the progressive increase of the population in the period of 1910 to 1915 which could be valued at 200.000 persons. Considering all which has been exposed, the Serbian losses must amount at least to one million men, women and children.

" But this is not all yet.

" Of the 150.000 prisoners and interned, the greatest part will disappear in consequence of the bad treatments, the want of food and clothings, and those who will remain will be incapable of any work. The Serbian losses will therefore exceed 1.000.000 i. e. more than one fifth of the total population of the Kingdom of Serbia. »

These are the sacrifices which the Serbian nation has suffered for liberty and independence. One really feels a cold chill when one looks at these figures exceeding every imagination.

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